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THE CURSE OF BLACK GOLD: HOW MARITIME OIL
RESERVES CAN SINK INTERNATIONAL
NEGOTIATIONS
DOUGLAS R. BROOKING ∗
When one hears of oil and gas development today, the debates in the new
media also seem to focus on the certain drilling techniques, pipeline
placements, and the roll of “foreign oil.” The often-forgotten area of oil and
gas development, an area of tremendous potential, lies offshore, under the
sea. Subsea petroleum development has played a huge role in the industry,
and the control of oil and gas fields beneath the sea surface remains vital for
both domestic and international interests of almost every nation. Every
nation and oil and gas company desires efficient, safe, environmentally
mindful, and profitable oil and gas production. To effectively achieve this
goal, control of the petroleum molecules, or the right to proceeds of their
development, must be accurately and definitively determined, lest the
industry fall into chaos. Despite the international community’s best efforts,
maritime boarder disputes still exist in certain areas around the world,
impeding the development of oil and gas.
This paper explores the development of maritime law, first throughout
history, and then in relation to the access to and control of subsea oil and
∗ The author is a second-year student at the University of Oklahoma College of Law.
Thank you to my editors, Megan Anson and Mariah Borek, without whom this comment
would not have been possible. Additionally, I would like to thank Professor Kristen van de
Biezenbos for her guidance, suggestions, and expertise in the maritime and oil and gas law
fields. Finally, I would like to thank the University of Oklahoma College of Law and Oil and
Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Law Journal for the opportunity to research and
publish this comment.
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gas plays. This paper additionally highlights certain disputed territorial
claims around the world and provides reasons why dispute resolution has
been successful or unsuccessful in those regions. This paper suggests the
role that private oil and gas companies could play in dispute resolutions
regarding these disputed fields, citing both the positive and negatives that a
non-governmental, international body can bring to the dispute resolution
arena. Although not the perfect solution to the difficulties of settling
international maritime disputes, private, commercial entities may offer one
other method to find lasting peace in certain maritime boarder disputes.
Law of the Sea
Much if not all of history has been defined by the dominate power of the
sea. Power over and control of the sea equated a control of the market. The
evolution of the market economy and the global market, thanks again to
maritime navigation, shrunk the world and brought greater disagreement
regarding the most powerful trading network on the planet. Access to and
rights over (and under) the Sea became vital to every nation, without which
they may lose out on the next great innovation or discovery. 1 To establish
parity, or at least attempt to, the various nations of the world called upon
the United Nations to establish some sort of law for the sea and a system to
settle disputes.
From the first moments of maritime expansion, control of the sea was
limited to those nations with the will and economic power to successfully
navigate the globe.2 Colonial expansion brought world wars, and those
world wars brought increased interest to the control of the seas. Unilateral
and bipartisan agreements no longer satisfied the insatiable thirst for
control, and perhaps more importantly, the exclusive control of the large
swaths of open waters from competing nations, both economically and
militarily. This created a problem on the high seas where the rights to
control traditionally ended within inline of the shore or that nations' vessel.3
The Cold War and the proliferation of the world’s superpowers enabled
certain seafaring nations to operate, control, use, and destroy maritime
natural resources at an alarming rate. 4 Quickly, nations began to claim large
1. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Historical Perspective,
UNITED NATIONS (2012), http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_
historical_perspective.htm (examining multiple examples of maritime disagreement
regarding access to natural resources).
2. Id.
3. U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess., 1515th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1515 (Nov. 1, 1967).
4. Id. at 3-5.
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sections of the sea for themselves—rights above and below the surface. The
open sea, the area far beyond the shoreline and the direct control of nations,
contains the largest wealth of natural resources located above, within, and
below the sea, and the international free-for-all became too great for the
globe to sustain, so the United Nations set out to resolve the disagreements.
Finally, in 1973, the United Nations convened to create some sort of
lasting solution to the problem regarding the control of the sea. 5 It took
nearly a decade of diplomacy, deal making, and problem solving to finally
formulate a solution. 6 The Law of the Sea resolution established many
guidelines relating to navigation, economic development, and national
defense at sea. 7 The United States, for several reasons, chose not to adopt
the Law of the Sea as resolved by the United Nations. 8 This meant, at least
formally, the United States did not abide by the same maritime standards
and laws as the 150 other nations that joined the Law of the Sea Resolution.
The Law of the Sea covers a broad range of topics in the hopes to
remedy issues before they arise and to establish a system to resolve all other
disputes. This comment specifically focuses on the economic concerns
resolved by the Law of the Sea, as these resolutions govern most directly
the acquisition of and interest in particular natural resource deposits below
the ocean surface. The continued growth of global demand for oil and
natural gas has led to increased exploration of potential petroleum fields
below the sea’s surface. Nations and multinational corporations (MNCs)
have a significant interest in acquiring the rights to develop these fields and
market the resources around the world. To successfully develop and market
the field, the developer needs to first establish the nation with the rights to
those natural resources and then acquire the rights to produce those natural
resources.
History of Maritime Law
As in every area of law, the Law of the Sea developed out of the
historical significance of maritime law and the modern necessity to preserve
and maintain peace and sovereignty. As soon as mankind took to the high

5. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Historical Perspective,
supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10,
1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter Law of the
Sea].
8. Id.
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seas, systems of laws and regulations began to pop up, thus planting the
seeds that grew into modern maritime law.
The first documented code of admiralty law, at least in the West,
originated in the Mediterranean under the great sea power of Ancient
Greece, Rhodes. 9 The Rhodian Sea Laws set forth uniform regulations by
which the sailors, captains, port masters, and empires were to relate with
one another while conducting their sailing operations.10 Over the years, the
transitions of power from empire to empire altered and added to the
Rhodian Sea Laws as best served the particular empire; with the growth of
sailing technology, so expanded trade into the far corners of the
Mediterranean and Europe. 11 The various codes and customs that developed
around the world focused specifically on the law governing maritime
commerce. The maritime powers fought, diplomatically and militarily, for
the control of shipping routes, rights to explore, and access to new markets,
as it became clear to the powers that “the financial power base was shifting,
at least to some degree, from land-based commerce to maritime
commerce.” 12 Regardless of the interests sought, the seafaring nations of
the world knew that they needed to move in the direction of unifying their
efforts to maintain equitable and predictable legal systems about the sea.
The increased calls for uniformity in maritime laws resulted in perhaps
the first maritime legal conferences of their kind in Antwerp in 1885 and in
Brussels in 1888, each with the goal of creating uniform laws for all
mariners. 13 Not long after these conferences, the nations of Europe met
again in Brussels in 1897 to establish a similar set of codes to provide some
semblance of uniformity on both sides of the Atlantic.14 These two
conferences and the legal minds that bore the results eventually formed the
Comité Maritime International (CMI), with the stated goal to become a
non-governmental organization to promote the unification of all aspects of

9. Robert D. Benedict, The Historical Position of the Rhodian Law, 18 YALE L.J. 223
(1909).
10. Gordon W. Paulsen, An Historical Overview of the Development of Uniformity in
International Maritime Law, 57 TUL. L. REV. 1065 (1983).
11. Id. at 1071-74.
12. Id. at 1075.
13. Albert Lilar & Carlo van den Bosch, LE COMITÉ MARITIME INTERNATIONAL 18971972 6, (Comité Maritime Int’l 1972), http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/History/
LILAR-VAN%20DEN%20BOSCH-Le%20Comit%C3%A9%20Maritime%20International.
pdf.
14. Id. at 12.
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maritime law. 15 From its constitution, two "of these words recognize the
past history of maritime law, its present dilemma, and its future. The first is
non-governmental, indicating its professional rather than political
foundation. The second is, of course, uniformity, a word used by
governments as often as it is not practiced by them." 16 The CMI and its
predecessor within the ranks of the United Nations, the International
Maritime Organization (IMO), both focused on the commerce conducted on
the surface of the seas and remained more or less silent regarding the
bountiful resources located beneath the sea floor.
Importance of Sub Sea Petroleum
The oil and natural gas industry predates the American Civil War when
Edwin Drake successfully drilled a well and extracted oil in Titusville,
Pennsylvania. 17 The demand for electric power around the world drove
engineers, pioneers, and innovators to develop new and improved
techniques to access and discover petroleum reserves.18 Prospectors quickly
bought leases all over the country, which drove some companies to follow
in the footsteps of the explorers in the Age of Exploration and look to the
sea. As early as the 1890s, oil companies began to drill offshore, though
their operations resembled little more than immobile wooden docks
connected to the shore by gangplanks. 19 Moveable drilling barges entered
operation in the 1930s in Louisiana, although in inshore marshes rather than
on the open sea. 20 Within the decade, innovative oil companies sought to go
beyond inshore marshes to the open oceans. In 1938, two oil companies
drilled the first freestanding well about thirteen miles from the Louisiana

15. Comité Maritime International (CMI) Const. art. I, http://www.comitemaritime.org/
part-1-general/0,2736,13632,00.html.
16. See Paulsen, supra note 10, at 1084 (emphasis in the original).
17. Parke A. Dickey, The First Oil Well, Oil Industry Centennial: Journal of Petroleum
Technology, Jan 1959, 23. Drake’s well came because of coal gas, developed in England in
the 18th century but which could not sustain the need for worldwide power. Id. Drake’s well
did not produce the first hydrocarbons extracted from the earth to be used as fuel on a large
scale. Id.
18. Id. at 26.
19. The History of Offshore Oil and Gas in the United States (Long Version), National
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 1,
https://docs.lib.noaa.gov/noaa_documents/DWH_IR/reports/HistoryofDrillingStaffPaper22.p
df. The Commission notes that this paper is subject to change but is useful for expanded
knowledge beyond the special constraints of the official report. Id.
20. Id.
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coast. 21 This first well began the research and development of petroleum
located beneath the ocean. Soon, technology and the desire to control the
rights to different petroleum plays drove companies and nationalized
petroleum industries further from shore and into conflict with one another.
The U.S. offers an excellent starting point to examine the issue of
establishing the rights to develop oil and gas plays under navigable
waterways. The principle of Federalism, the divide of power between the
many states and the Federal government, has continuously effected the
legal landscape of the United States since its founding. Following the
Second World War, the ability to reinvest in offshore exploration caused
President Truman to proclaim for the federal government the exclusive
rights to the petroleum under the United States Continental Shelf.22 Almost
immediately, states with offshore oil production ignored this
proclamation. 23 The Supreme Court resolved the conflict in 1947 when it
denied the California’s claim to the three-mile tract of ocean beyond its
shores and granted the federal government the exclusive ability to grant
rights to the minerals in that tract.24 Congress codified a clarification to the
Supreme Court’s decision in that the “Submerged Lands Act,” which
granted all right and title to the respective states in land beneath navigable
water ways within three miles of the state’s shoreline. 25 All other rights and
titles outside this three-mile range remained with the federal government,
and permits granted in this land from the various states must be refiled with
the federal government. 26 With the passage of the Submerged Lands Act,
the United States established its own system by which private individuals
and corporations could seek rights to explore and extract minerals offshore.
Regardless of the respective states’ opinions of the Supreme Court
decisions and subsequent legislative clarification, the uniformity in the law
of right and title to subsea minerals brought some stability to negotiations
for the right to drill and develop offshore. While the United States may
have experienced relative stability in subsea petroleum negotiations,
international dispute resolution regarding maritime law still posed many
difficulties.
21. Id. at 2.
22. Id. at 4.
23. Id.
24. United States. v. State of California, 332 U.S. 19, 40-41 (1947); see also United
States. v. State of Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. State of Texas, 339 U.S.
707 (1950).
25. 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (2016).
26. Id.
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Dispute Resolution Prior to the Law of the Sea
The modern landscape in offshore petroleum rights and the players
involved in this fight constitute the largest obstacles for lawyers, diplomats,
and executives to peacefully and profitably produce subsea oil and gas
reserves. Three main parties play roles in the development of subsea
petroleum assets: the individual sovereign nations, one or more
international governmental organizations, and the petroleum company,
whether private or nationalized. The difficulty in deciding the proper
method of dispute resolution stems directly from the different positions of
these three distinct parties, specifically their bargaining power in relation to
one another and their power to impact international relations on a global
scale. Before discussing the modern dispute resolution case studies, it is
important to understand international dispute resolution prior to the
establishment of the Law of the Sea.
The simplest and most efficient route to take would require these actors,
specifically state actors, to negotiate their respective differences and result
in a state treaty. 27 Each party would propose solutions with little if any
input from outside actors not a party to the dispute. 28 The parties (there are
usually two, but can be multilateral) each put forward positions then work
through their respective diplomats and negotiators to reach a solution,
usually landing somewhere in the middle of the two proposals. 29
Negotiations allow a certain amount of flexibility for the parties to
maneuver through tenuous issues not just limited to international legal
disputes. 30 Negotiation, however, has its limits, the most notable and
troublesome being that the entire nature of the resolution hinges on the will
of the parties involved. 31 If one party wants to win each and every point
without conceding anything, the other party that may be more willing to
find mutual points of agreements can be left marooned at the negotiation
table. In situations in which one party either refuses to fairly negotiate or
simply refuses to abide by the terms of the negotiation, more forceful
mechanisms of peaceful dispute resolution can be implemented.

27. SIR HUMPHREY WALDOCK, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: THE LEGAL ASPECTS 77
(Europa Publications: London 1972).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 80. Opposing parties use litigation to avoid going before courts everyday, in
the United States and internationally. Negotiations allow parties to remain in control of their
own deal making before the necessity of a court or arbitrator to resolve the mutual issues.
31. Id.
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Occasionally, to get certain actors to work with one another, the parties
submit to international arbitration. The model definition for international
arbitrations has remained mostly unchanged from that of The Hague
Convention of 1899: “International arbitration has for its object the
settlement of difference between states by judges of their own choice, and
on the basis of a respect for the law.” 32 The two provisions of this definition
provide both the strength and weakness of arbitration. The clause, “by
judges of their own choice,” allows for the parties by agreement to appoint
a particular arbitrator to decide disputes in which they cannot agree.
Inherently, however, this implies that the parties can first agree on the
arbitrator and then that they will follow the decision thereof.33 Second, the
clause, “on the basis of a respect for the law,” empowers or rather
“requires” that parties accept the decision of the arbitration as binding and
abide by it as if it were some other international body of law.34 One word in
the clause can commandeer the entire arbitration process. The definition
and interpretation of “the law” has perplexed philosophers, politicians,
lawyers, and judges for millennia, and each state actor likely will have their
own definition. The inability to agree upon a definition of the “law” and the
inability to enforce arbitration agreements caused the international
arbitrations model to suffer.35
The international community attempted to ensure more effective
enforcement of arbitrations in the mid-twentieth century. Thus, the
International Law Commission, in 1953, proposed the adoption of a general
understanding about the goals, procedures, and requirements of arbitration
in the international setting. 36 The Commission approached the issue from
“the principle of non-frustration”; that I, by the principle that an
agreement to arbitrate involves an international obligation and
that states having once entered into such an obligation are bound
not only to take all necessary steps to allow the arbitration to

32. Id. at 101 (citing British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 91, 1889-99, p. 970; Scott,
Hague Court Reports, 1st Series, 1916, p. xxxii).
33. Id. at 102.
34. WALDOCK, supra note 27.
35. Id. at 107 (examining the ways that different countries legal definitions prolonged
the debates to establish a uniform international arbitration mechanism).
36. Id. at 106.
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proceed, but also to refrain from any action which would impede
or frustrate it. 37
This idea sought to fix the problem by allowing parties to back out of
agreements and use arbitration as a dispute resolution method. The
important hook for this change, however, came in the obligation to
arbitrate; if the country opts to arbitrate, failure to arbitrate then adversely
affects their position and continues regardless of their representative
presence. 38 Should parties fail to “take the necessary steps,” then the
compromise would remain enforceable, despite the actions of the
noncompliant party. 39 Although this amendment to international
arbitrational procedures might help with certain troublesome nations, some
disputes would continue to the final level of international dispute
resolution.
That final step in the international dispute resolution process comes in
the form of international courts. The international courts are the final
decision makers regarding international law and help to define the idea of
law in the international community. 40 The international courts combine the
other two forms of dispute resolution with an added note of objectivity from
the international community. The entire basis and existence of these courts
comes from the philosophy of international law. 41
Regardless of a state’s definition of or respect for the law, countries and
citizens understand that courts represent the idea of the rule of law. The
establishment of an international court first demonstrated to the global
community that “the law” flourished and remained important to all the
members of the global society. 42 The second theory behind the court
undoubtedly sprung from the common law judicial philosophy. 43 The
presence of an international court symbolizes the fact that the law itself
“tends to be more objective and autonomous but may be developed by the
Court in its jurisprudence.” 44 The United Nations sought to establish the
court so that international players would understand the system of
37. Id. at 106. (citing the commentary on the draft Convention on Arbitral Procedure,
A/CN. 4/92, April 1955).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 128.
41. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1946 I.C.J. Acts & Docs., art. 1,
http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/?p1=4&p2=2.
42. WALDOCK, supra note 27, at 130.
43. U.N. Charter art 94, ¶ 1.
44. WALDOCK, supra note 27, at 131.
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accountability and the method through which to file a grievance in the
international arena.45 Perhaps the most philosophically based method of
dispute resolution––the International Court of Justice––still lacked the
necessary enforcement mechanism missing in both negotiation and
arbitration, outside of an appeal to the Security Council. 46
All these different forms could be applied to a variety of international
disputes, including those specifically regarding issues at sea. However, the
growth of the global economy and the increased technological abilities to
access the resources of the oceans caused the international community to
revisit international law, specifically maritime law. The traditional forms of
law no longer sufficed to meet the needs of the increased legal interest in
the subsea resources. 47 With increased interest and economic potential
beneath the sea came increased tension between nations to have the rights
to primary access to these minerals and other resources.48 The increased
reward or profit potential made it even harder for the international
community to bring parties to the table to cooperate and inevitably bargain
for exchange. Thus, the United Nations decided to create a new body of law
that would join the nations together. The law crafted eventually became
known as the Law of the Sea.
Importance of the Law of the Sea
Up through the adoption of the Law of the Sea, the only real control of
the sea and the rights thereto came through the traditional forms of
international law: treaties and customs. 49 Treaties, in their own regard, still
occupy perhaps the best option for parties wishing to benefit and convert
oceanic resources. However, even treaties have their shortcomings both
through a lack of enforcement mechanisms and the tenuous ability of
parties to give rights away. 50 Customary international law creates perhaps
an even greater enigma for international scholars to decipher. The primary
issue with customary law stems from the need for “relatively uniform and
consistent state practice regarding a particular matter.” 51 For nations with
45. U.N. Charter, supra note 43, at ¶ 2.
46. Id.
47. Gabriele Goettsche-Wanli, The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea:
Multilateral Diplomacy at Work, U.N. CHRONICLE (Dec. 2014), https://unchronicle.un.org/
article/united-nations-convention-law-sea-multilateral-diplomacy-work.
48. Id.
49. Paulsen, supra note 10, at 1066.
50. SEAN D. MURPHY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (THOMSON WEST 2006).
51. Id.
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extensive diplomatic or economic ties, customary practices might very well
be able to govern most disputes. Given their mutual proximity to and
reliance on the North Sea, the International Court of Justice looked to the
customs of interaction between the United Kingdom and Norway to settle a
dispute. 52 The reliance upon custom, rather than the establishment of some
new international law, better suited the two nations. However, not all states
have a mutually amicable or interested customary law like the UK and
Norway. 53 Many states have openly adverse goals regarding one another’s
customs in the region or even around the globe. 54
To appropriately manage the vast resources contained in the oceans and
the common inability of nations to see eye-to-eye, the international
community needs a clear system to determine economic rights and dispute
resolution mechanisms. Therefore, one of the most important interests
established by the Law of the Sea came in the form of each (coastal)
nation’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). 55 A particular nation’s EEZ
allows that state to “assume[ ] jurisdiction over the exploration and
exploitation of marine resources in its adjacent section of the continental
shelf.” 56 This area extends out 200 nautical miles from the shoreline.57 This
exclusive control grants the respective states immense power in the ability
to develop, exploit, or market the resources contained in that particular
zone. 58 Even the 200-nautical-mile distinction creates problems between the
nations, as Libya and Malta fought (in court) to establish how this mileage
is measured. 59 Although these 200 miles might contain countless resources,
these maritime resources may not be sedentary or may extend beyond these
200 miles. It is outside the EEZs that the Law of the Sea becomes truly
important.
The Law of the Sea makes one incredibly important distinction for the
EEZ from other interests a nation might possess in the sea. Islands extend
the EEZ’s of nations, but that does not mean that all islands claimed by a
nation established an EEZ. The Law of the Sea importantly notes that
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. 116, 139, (Dec. 18).
WALDOCK, supra note 27, at 133.
Id.
Law of the Sea, supra note 7, at Part IV, art. 48.
DEPT. FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INFORMATION AND POLICY ANALYSIS: STATISTICS
DIVISION, GLOSSARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL STATISTICS, (FEB. 1997), http://unstats.un.org/
unsd/publication/SeriesF/SeriesF_67E.pdf.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 34 (June 3).
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“[r]ocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their
own shall have no exclusive economic zone.” 60 With the development of
modern engineering and the ability to construct artificial islands for any
number of uses, this provision will become even more important.
Most––if not all––legal systems desire to establish a system in which
parties, both foreign and domestic, can transact business with some sort of
clarity. Although the transactions may differ depending on the
sophistication of legal systems or the unfortunate corruption of government
officials, states and private players desire a predictable system in which to
conduct business. Acquiring the rights to access the resources of one EEZ
remains mostly unchanged by the Law of the Sea: simply contract with the
controlling coastal nation. 61 However, as so often happens, contracts fail,
parties become dissatisfied with the terms, or perhaps the most detrimental
option, the parties to the contract never possessed the rights to the economic
interest in the first place. “Although the Convention that emerged . . .
accepts extensive coastal state control over broad coastal zones, it limits the
broadest unilateral claims of sovereignty over these zones and guarantees
navigational freedoms to maritime powers.” 62 The limitation of broad
economic claims sought to secure the interests of parties with lesser
bargaining power over maritime resources and traditional international
subordinates ravaged from centuries of imperialism. 63
The Law of the Sea creates a series of mechanisms with which to settle
international disputes. The first and most important requirement of the Law
of the Sea is a peaceful resolution of the dispute, which takes precedent
over all other requirements of dispute resolution.64 When states cannot
come to a peaceful resolution on their own, the Law of the Sea lays out a
plan through which the disputes may be resolved. First, the parties must
exchange their respective views regarding the particular dispute, and in the
absence of a decision, parties must agree to non-binding recommendations
from a panel of conciliators. 65 Should this solution fail, the states must
submit to one of four different fora to issue binding declaration: the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the International Court of

60. Law of the Sea, supra note 7, at art. 121.
61. Id. at art. 56.
62. John E. Noyes, The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 32 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 109, 114 (1998).
63. See id.
64. Law of the Sea, supra note 7, at art. 280.
65. Id. at art. 283-84.
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Justice, a general arbitral tribunal, or a special arbitral tribunal.66
Whichever fora is used, the decision is binding upon the parties to the
dispute resolution. 67
This extensive dispute resolution apparatus can aid many nations in the
resolutions of disputes but raises two important problems with the Law of
the Sea. First, that the Law of the Sea remains limited to those nations that
have ratified the Convention, which excludes the United States.68 Second,
despite the “binding nature” of the Law of the Sea resolutions, enforcement
mechanisms remain wholly inadequate in their ability to ensure the partystates abide by the decisions.
Non-Party Members
The United States foreign policy toes the line of a careful dichotomy
between the isolationist nation of the early twentieth century to the sole
superpower following the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. Domestic
political opinion controls much of the United States’ foreign policy
decisions, with most Americans desiring to keep power at home rather than
submitting to foreign control. President Clinton submitted the Law of the
Sea to Congress in 1994, whereupon Congress failed to vote for nearly a
decade and eventually rejected the Law of the Sea, citing that it “would
constitute the most egregious transfer of American sovereignty, wealth, and
power to the U.N. since the founding of that ‘world body.’” 69 Despite the
America’s failure to adopt the Law of the Sea, like so many of her allies
and rivals, the United States still abides by many of its provisions. But the
failure to become a party to the Convention causes two layers of regulation
for other countries operating in United States waters; they must abide by the
Law of the Sea and the US laws governing the sea.70 In addition, the United
States enters binding agreements with party members regularly, often
concerning the petroleum interests around the world. Perhaps the most
notable example comes out of the negotiations regarding the Arctic
resources.
66. Id. at art. 287.
67. Id. at art. 15.
68. See, U.N., CHRONOLOGICAL LISTS OF RATIFICATIONS OF, ACCESSIONS AND
SUCCESSIONS TO THE CONVENTION AND THE RELATED AGREEMENTS, (last updated Sep. 23,
2016), http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm.
69. MURPHY, supra note 50, at 365 (citation omitted).
70. Patricia C. Bauerlein, The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea & (and)
U.S. Ocean Environmental Practice: Are We Complying with International Law, 17 LOY.
L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 899, 919 (1995).
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The Arctic region represents perhaps the most untapped area of resources
left on the planet. In 2008, the United States estimated that the Arctic
contained thirteen percent of the undiscovered oil and thirty percent of the
undiscovered gas, with the majority of this potential discovery occurring in
offshore plays. 71 This vast potential of resources, in addition to issues such
as polar ice, climate change, and control of shipping routes, demanded that
Arctic nations take action to protect their interests. Different nations began
taking bold steps, including shows of economic and military force, as well
as diplomatic appeals to the U.N. 72 With the United States not being a party
to the Law of the Sea and the other Arctic nations vying for control of the
vast resources, the eight Arctic nations––with the addition of the indigenous
peoples of the Arctic regions––sought to establish an independent accord to
help govern Arctic disputes. 73 These countries adopted The Ottawa
Declaration, which declared that the member states would seek cooperative
solutions and work together to establish proper access to the Arctic
resources. 74 The Arctic Council is more of a joint operating agreement
between the nations rather than any sort of international legal framework
under which disputes might be settled like the Law of the Sea. However,
this accord constitutes another step in the correct direction regarding
dispute resolution at sea, as it specifically denotes the desire to work
together for the future development of Arctic resources. 75
The United States has also found other ways to govern their Southern
maritime interests without resorting to international government bodies for
resolution. The United States and Mexico entered a treaty through which
the two nations might equitably divide the resources of the Gulf of Mexico.
A system of peace and reliability of action in the Gulf requires the two
dominant nations surrounding the Gulf of Mexico to establish a mechanism
through which to tap into these resources. To do this, the two nations
entered into a treaty dividing the Gulf on a latitudinal basis, which granted
each nation sole right to develop the resources below the surface of the sea
71. 90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas Assessed in
the Arctic, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., (July 23, 2008, 1:00 PM), https://archive.usgs.gov/
archive/sites/www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp-ID=1980.html.
72. See, e.g., Scott G. Borgerson, Arctic Meltdown: The Economic and Security
Implications of Global Warming, 87 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 2 (Mar. – Apr. 2008) (highlighting
Russia’s strategic bomber flyovers, Canada’s Arctic military expenditures, and Denmark’s
appeal to the UN under the Law of the Sea).
73. Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, Sep. 19, 1996, 35 I.L.M.
1382.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1388.
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on their respective side. 76 This bilateral treaty, with the addition of various
treaties with the other Caribbean nations, enabled the United States to
secure its maritime interest without being a party to the Law of the Sea.77
Other nations have likewise found ways to resolve their differences
about subsea petroleum rights outside of an appeal to the Law of the Sea.
The Loran-Mantee natural gas field crosses the maritime boundary between
Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago. For the interests to be properly
divided, the two nations negotiated for more than a decade to establish
ownership. 78The field contained an estimated ten trillion cubic foot (Tcf) of
natural gas sandstone reservoirs that spanned the area around the two
nations borders. 79 Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago allowed for various
international gas companies to research and explore the gas contained
within the field and, more particularly, which nations controlled the right to
produce or sell the rights to production.80
The Loran-Mantee agreement recognizes two particularly important
issues with the development of subsea petroleum rights. First, the extensive
research done demonstrates the importance of definitively establishing
ownership interests prior to development for each field discovery to prevent
future disputes. Second, it demonstrates the role that corporate entities can
play in the establishment of rights. Development of subsea petroleum
involves significant investment in terms of money and time. As exemplified
in the decade and a half long negotiation between Venezuela and Trinidad
and Tobago, the research and development of these significant resources
can often be too great for individual nations to take on. For this reason,
countries may choose to exchange the rights to develop the petroleum in
exchange for the oil and gas companies to put in the upfront costs of
76. Treaty on Maritime Boundaries between the United Mexican States and the United
States of America, U.S.-Mex. (May 4, 1978) S. Treaty Doc. EX. F, 96-1 (1997).
77. See, Treaty Establishing Caribbean Maritime Boundaries, U.S.-U.K., Mar. 9, 1994,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-23 (1994); Three Treaties Establishing Maritime Boundaries
Between the United States and Mexico, Venezuela and Cuba, S. Treaty Doc. No. 96-08
(1979).
78. Five-Year Wait for Loran/Manatee Gas, TRINIDAD & TOBAGO GUARDIAN ONLINE
(Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.guardian.co.tt/business/2015-10-01/five-year-wait-loranmanateegas.
79. PDVSA and Chevron to Develop the Loran-Manatee, SUBSEAIQ (Sept. 13, 2013),
http://www.subseaiq.com/data/Project.aspx?project_id=1657&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupp
ort=1.
80. Curtis Williams, Venezuela, Trinidad and Tobago Sign Cross Boarder Development
Deal, OIL & GAS J., (May 24, 2016), http://www.ogj.com/articles/2016/05/venezuelatrinidad-and-tobago-sign-cross-border-development-deal.html.
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establishing and gathering all the information about the different petroleum
rights. Thus, oil and gas companies can play a very important role in
dispute resolution schemes in future disputed territories.
For every great triumph in hurdling the challenges of international
negotiations, many petroleum fields remain contested around the world.
Various economic, political, and military interests cause many nations to
become embroiled in deadlock debates that can last for decades. And even
upon the resolution one or multiple nations may not like the decision and
thus refuse to abide by the decision of the particular dispute.
Still other interests might be implicated in negotiations regarding a
disputed oil and gas field. Control and ownership could implicate issue of
national security or national pride dating back centuries. In addition to
economic and political concerns, negotiation efforts might also get bogged
down based on different countries international influence. Russia and Japan
both possess formidable national economies with strong links to
international markets. Even since its fall from superpower status, Russia
still possesses an indisputable advantage in regards to international
influence. And one such dispute between Russia and Japan dates back over
fifty years to the dwindling days of World War II.
Kuril Island Dispute
The battle regarding territorial claims between Japan and Russia
continued long after the guns of World War II fell silent in 1945. Despite a
ceasefire, the Soviet Union (and its successor, Russia) and Japan failed to
ever sign a formal peace treaty. 81 One of the major issues holding up peace
negotiation, both then and now, stems from the disputed control over the
Kuril Islands. 82
The specific issue regarding the rights to economic explorations in the
Kuril Islands (or “Northern Territories” to Japan) manifested themselves
more importantly in the second half of the twentieth century. 83 The Soviets
invaded the islands as part of their effort in the Pacific theater following the
surrender of Nazi Germany and held possession of them at the time of the
Japanese surrender. 84 The legal struggle regarding control stems from the

81. Keith A. Call, Southern Kurils or Northern Territories? Resolving the RussoJapanese Border Dispute, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 727 (1992).
82. Glen W. Price, Legal Analysis of the Kurile Island Dispute, 7 TEMP. INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 395 (1993).
83. Call, supra note 81, at 730.
84. Id. at 731.
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most recent international agreement regarding the Kuril Islands’ status:
Japan agreed to renounce all right to the island, but the Soviet Union never
signed the treaty. 85 Despite the Soviet Union’s failure to sign the treaty, the
Japanese revocation of all right to the island would seem to quiet the debate
regarding control. However, the Cold War and the subsequent status of the
United States as the sole superpower emerging from the early 1990s often
forced politicians and international legal tacticians to resort to claims
outside the legal framework.
The breakdown of negotiations following the Soviet failure to sign the
peace treaty at the end of World War II caused further disputes that
expanded far outside the Kuril Islands. The politically charged nature of
every dispute, anywhere in the world, throughout the Cold War caused
every nation to fight desperately for control of certain areas and use threats,
to garner support. When Japan and the United States argued for stronger
Japanese interests in and rights to the development of the Kuril Islands, the
Soviets responded by threating to block U.S. and Japanese fishing interests
in the Northern Pacific and Arctic Oceans. 86 The Cold War also posed the
constant threat of military intervention in small localized conflicts as well
as on the macro, thermonuclear scale. The breakup of the Soviet Union and
the presence of a single superpower quieted some of the military tensions of
the Cold War but left behind the economic battlegrounds from years past.
The development of the subsea petroleum industry has only further
perpetuated the claims of both nations for control of the islands. Current
estimates claim that two fields occupy the disputed area with estimated
reserves at one billion barrels of oil and 500 billion cubic meters of natural
gas. 87 Although some development has begun on the fields and foreign
investment into the regions hydrocarbon development continues, the fact
that disputes have not been completely finalized leaves any potential
undertaking vulnerable. 88 Private hydrocarbon development may well be at
the mercy of potential nationalization efforts, such as those that
nationalized BP’s assets in Libya in 1971. 89 Any private oil and gas
85. Id. at 732.
86. Bruce A. Elleman, Michael R. Nichols & Matthew J. Ouimet, A Historical
Reevaluation of America’s Role in the Kuril Islands, 71 PAC. AFFAIRS 498 (Winter, 19981999).
87. .Sakhalin & Kurile Islands, JURISDICTION PROJECT: INSTITUTE OF ISLAND STUDIES,
http://projects.upei.ca/iis/files/2016/11/Sakhalin-Kurile-Islands.pdf.
88. Id.
89. G. Winthrop Haight, Libyan Nationalization of British Petroleum’s Assets, 6 INT’L
LAW. 541.
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company would want to ensure that their interests in the region would be
well represented, but more importantly, well protected, lest their oil and gas
assets suffer nationalization to Gazprom, as occurred in Libya. 90 This is not
to suggest that Gazprom would undertake such a measure, as Gazprom’s
motives differ greatly from those of the Revolutionary Libyan government
of the 1970s, but rather to suggest a frame work of protection for MNCs to
protect their assets and insure stability of development.
Nationalized Interests
In the international oil and gas industry, the race to acquire petroleum
rights and control the cornerstone of markets has two main participants:
Multinational oil and gas corporations (ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell,
British Petroleum, etc.) and nationalized petroleum companies (Gazprom,
Perotbas, China National Petroleum Corp., etc). In the race to dominate
rights to reserves and production, the multinational corporations occupy a
meager ten percent of the market share compared to nationalized companies
controlling over seventy-five percent of the market. 91 The nationalized
companies profit from the ability to use public money to jumpstart the
expansion and pressure private companies into selling off petroleum rights.
Rather than allowing mineral owners to sell the rights to develop the
minerals they control, nationalized oil and gas companies develop and
control the minerals in the ground and after production for the claimed
benefit of the entire country. For example, in 2006 to 2007 alone, Russia
increased political pressure by revoking permits and pressuring sales to
solidify Gazprom as the world’s largest producer of natural gas.92 The
nationalized companies have another tool in addition to the ability of their
respective governments to pressure private competitors: since these
companies operate as an agency of the sovereign nation, they do not need to
fight other companies for rights to take with the government. The
tremendous potential for increased production and thus increased profit
from offshore energy plays, can bring about increased tension regarding
hydrocarbon recovery and disagreements regarding the dispute resolution
mechanism most apt to work.

90. Id.
91. Ian Bremmer, The Long Shadow of the Visible Hand, WALL STREET J. (May 22,
2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487048520045752585418
75590852.
92. Id.
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With the clear majority of oil and gas reserves controlled by nationalized
companies, a deeper knowledge of these types of oil and gas companies
will clarify the implications on disputed petroleum plays. The structure of
nationalized industries, their control mechanisms, and the methodological
basis for their founding will weigh heavily on any effort to broker some sort
of cohesive, mutually beneficial deal regarding disputed oil and gas rights.
Economics remains the main driving force behind the decision to
nationalize the oil and gas industries in most countries. Nationalization
allows the government to avoid hydrocarbon revenue sharing with private
corporations 93 This offers a two-fold benefit for the country. First, the
country can acquire the entire revenue from its oil and gas industry and
reinvest that money in the domestic oil industry or enter profit sharing
agreements to develop international petroleum trade to market their
products. 94 Second, a nationalized industry’s control of the country’s oil
and gas assets can be spun off as protection against foreign interests and
exploitation of the country’s oil and gas resources.95 These two interests
would become decisive during times of high oil and gas prices, as privately
owned interests would allow for the money to leave the country with the
actual oil, whereas a nationalized industry would keep the revenue at
home. 96
Control of oil reserves also lends massive political power to countries in
addition to the economic interests. Following the Arab-Israeli War of 1973
and the subsequent oil embargo, nations around the world realized how they
could assert control over other countries, both friend and foe, using national
control of the oil industry. 97 The twentieth Century saw an explosion in the
demand for oil, especially in the developed world. The reliance on foreign
oil, specifically by the United States, presented an opportunity for the
nationalized industries to flex their muscles. Thus, since the 1970s,
countries have advocated for “energy independence,” or being able to
control their own destiny in regards to acquisition to adequate supply of
energy. 98 Perhaps the better term might be “energy diversification.”99 As a
93. Paasha Mahdavi, Why Do Leaders Nationalize the Oil Industry? The Politics of
Resource Expropriation, 75 ENERGY POL’Y 228, 229 (2014).
94. Id. at 230.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. American Oil Investors' Access to Domestic Courts in Foreign Nationalization
Disputes, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 610 (1975).
98. John J. Fialka, Energy Independence: A Dry Hole?, WALL STREET J. (updated July
5, 2006, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB115204999066897677.
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large consumer nation, the United States cannot afford to put all their eggs
in one OPEC-controlled basket again or risk the gas shortages following the
embargo. Instead, the country has attempted to create a balance between
imported hydrocarbons, hydrocarbons produced in North America, and
renewable sources, to maintain good relations with OPEC nations while not
allowing for too much vulnerability on the domestic consumer market. 100 It
is this control, however, that fully develops the one-two punch for
nationalized petroleum companies at the negotiation table.
When nationalized oil and gas companies come to the negotiation table,
they bring with them these basic economic and political arguments that
often overshadow any potential deal that might be brokered. When the
ownership of the petroleum assets is undisputed, private parties negotiate
for profit sharing measures in ways similar to the negotiation methods in
the United States. In the United States, companies negotiate oil and gas
leases with the private mineral interest owners or with surface owners to
build pipelines or other midstream or downstream instillations.101 For
nationalized interests, the private companies must negotiate with the
government to access the minerals or rights to build the necessary
infrastructure to access and develop the minerals. However, this paper is
focused on the unique situation of negotiating for the rights to petroleum
when two nations dispute the ownership of the petroleum. The method and
outcome of negotiation will completely change, depending on whether any
of the sovereign participants have nationalized oil and gas industries. To
understand the consequences of the various implications of negotiating with
industries more thoroughly, a brief highlight of one such country’s
nationalized corporate structure may explain negotiation efforts.
Perhaps the most well-known nationalized company is Gazprom, the
Russian natural gas giant. Gazprom controls the world’s largest shares of
natural gas reserves, with seventeen percent of the global reserves and
seventy-two percent of the Russian gas reserves. 102 The Russian Federation,
either directly or indirectly (through shared ownership of other state
controlled industries) owns more than fifty percent of Gazprom’s shares,

99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Robert A. James, United States: California, OIL & GAS L. REV., 363,
https://www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Publications/UnitedStatesCalifornia.pdf.
102. About Gazprom, GAZPROM, http://www.gazprom.com/about/ (last visited Jan. 19,
2017).
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giving it the controlling interest of the gas giant.103 Gazprom’s corporate
structure allows for corporate voting based on shareholder ownership, with
the general operations run by the executives and Board of Directors. 104 This
corporate structure, with the majority ownership of shares by the Russian
government, gives the Russian government the controlling interest in voting
on business decisions and directors. So, for any negotiation with Gazprom,
parties must inherently negotiate with the Russian government, lest any
deal struck in the boardroom be overruled during the next shareholder
voting cycle. As countries do not usually want to relinquish control of
valuable assets or abandon any claim thereof, negotiation efforts with
Gazprom may often place the outside private party with an uphill battle.
In relation to the Kuril Islands dispute, Japan, an open-market oil and gas
industry, lacking the singular power of an nationalized petroleum giant,
would negotiate with Gazprom. Since the end of the Second World War,
Japan has created one of the fastest growing and largely market-based
economies in the world. 105 Japan focused on privatizing ownership interests
in all industries, with corporations and private citizens promoting, investing
in, and receiving the benefits of the Japanese economy. 106 This style of
economy helped Japan to recover from a war-ravaged wasteland to the
world’s second largest economy less than twenty years after the war.107
However, with lack of public-sector control on the oil and gas industry, it
lacks the same enforcement mechanisms possessed by a nationalized
company. The lack of nationalization allows greater flexibility and ease of
negotiation for similarly situated parties but often places private parties at a
disadvantage with nationalized industries. 108 When the nation’s only stake
in the oil and gas industry comes from the tax revenue, as in a market
economy, the government will not use their political influence to aid the oil
103. Equity Capital Structure, GAZPROM, http://www.gazprom.com/investors/structure/
(last visited Jan. 19, 2017).
104. Resolution of the Annual General Shareholders’ Meeting of PJSC Gazprom,
GAZPROM (June 30, 2016), http://www.gazprom.com/f/posts/74/562608/regulationsshareholders-meeting-2016-06-30-en_ms.pdf.
105. Lucien Ellington, Learning from the Japanese Economy, NAT’L CLEARINGHOUSE
FOR UNITED STATES-JAPANESE STUD., (Sept. 2004).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. WALDOCK, supra note 27, at 133. While this discusses the ability of the
International Court of Justice to adjudicate cases between countries of the same bloc during
the Cold War, the premise carries over to privatized-nationalized dichotomy in the oil and
gas industry. Negotiations will be much more difficult between parties not similarly situated
due to their inherent differences regarding government control on the oil and gas industry.
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and gas negotiations in their favor to the same extent that a nationalized
government would.
The seemingly daily technological advancements made in the oil and gas
industry have proliferated the number of fields that nations now can access.
However, this ability can be limited by territorial disputes even more recent
than the Kuril Islands dispute, a relatively calm dispute between nations.
This calm does not exist today in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. Beginning
in 2009, several nations discovered natural gas plays under the
Mediterranean. 109 These particular plays represent more than just massive
natural resource deposits with the potential for development. The Eastern
Mediterranean and near East have been in almost a perpetual state of war
for the better part of half a century. The discovery of natural gas plays has
the potential to bring energy independence or stability to the region that has
long quarreled over access to adequate energy sources.
Eastern Mediterranean Gas Field Disputes
Since the 2009 discoveries, various nations discovered numerous plays
in their territorial waters. Israel discovered first the Tamar field, followed
soon after by the Leviathan field, which experts estimate contain up to
twenty-six TcF of natural gas. 110 This amount of gas could allow for Israel
to break their dependence on Middle Eastern hydrocarbons, a geopolitical
splinter in the side of international peace in the region. 111 Since the Israeli
discoveries, a United States firm discovered the Aphrodite field in Cyprian
territorial waters and an Italian company discovered the Zohr field in
Egyptian waters. 112 For these three nations, the fields represent the potential
to meet some, if not all, of the nations’ natural gas needs, as well as the
potential to become net exporters to the rest of Europe. 113 The Zohr field
also has the ability to potentially help cure an ongoing energy crisis within
Egypt. 114 These fields pose the possibility to potentially enable negotiations
between hostile nations to be brokered if they can set aside disputes.

109. Michael Ratner, Natural Gas Discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean, CONG. RES.
SERV., 1 (Aug. 15, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R44591.pdf.
110. Yuri Zhukov, Trouble in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea: The Coming Dash for
Gas, Foreign Affairs (last updated Jan 2, 2014), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
cyprus/2013-03-20/trouble-eastern-mediterranean-sea.
111. Ratner, supra note 109, at 11.
112. Id. at 5.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 7.
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Since its founding in 1948, Israel and her neighbors have struggled to
find peace. The root of the absence of regional peace is beyond the scope of
this article. Specific to the natural gas plays in the Mediterranean, Lebanon
and Israel dispute the maritime boarder between the two nations territorial
waters. 115 The dispute dates to the Israeli-Lebanese War in 1949 when the
two nations disputed the armistice line that extended out into the Sea as the
de facto maritime boarder. 116 The territorial dispute does not directly
concern the Tamar and Leviathan plays but rather impacts Lebanon’s
claimed ability to develop unidentified fields in its own territorial waters.117
The Israeli-Lebanese dispute is not the only roadblock stopping the
development of the natural gas field of the Mediterranean.
The island of Cyprus contains two separate governments, both of which
claim to govern the entire island. The U.N. and the majority of the world
governments formally recognizes the Republic of Cyprus as the
government of the entire island, whereas Turkey alone recognizes the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as the true government. 118 This divide
has been at a stalemate since 1974, with United Nations peacekeeping
forces attempting to forgo another outbreak of violence.119 Although the
Republic of Cyprus might have international recognition, this does not
inherently solve the problem for the disputed gas fields, as Turkey, one of
the region’s major players, wants to forgo development “until a resolution
to the ‘Cyprus problem’ is found.” 120 The potential for the Aphrodite field
to enable Cyprus to lower emissions through cleaner energy or simply sell
the rights to development could play a dynamic and important role in so
desired resolution to the Cyprus problem.
The Zohr field, though important to the region, most likely will enable
Egypt to solve or lessen certain domestic issues. Although important to the
peace and prosperity in the region, the Egyptian development of the Zohr

115. Id. at 9.
116. Id. (citation omitted).
117. Id. at 2. (examining the map charting the disputed Lebanese-Israeli maritime
boarder in relation to the discovered gas fields).
118. Doug Bandow, Resolving the Cyprus Problem, CATO INST., (Dec. 7, 1999),
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/resolving-cyprus-problem.
119. A. Marco Turk, Cyprus Reunification Is Long Overdue: The Time Is Right for Track
III Diplomacy As the Best Approach for Successful Negotiation of This Ethnic Conflict, 28
LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 205, 206 (2006).
120. Ratner, supra note 109, at 6.
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field will likely play little to no role in international concerns, as Egypt will
not likely export any of the produced natural gas. 121
The fragile state of the region, the deep-rooted conflicts between the
countries, the ever-growing demand for energy, and the discovery of
recoverable hydrocarbons prime the region for renewed efforts to settle
these disputes. This paper does not seek to oversimplify the complex and
nuanced art of international negotiations to end longstanding conflicts.
Instead, this paper focuses on the ways that the oil and gas industry can be
used as a carrot to aid negotiations and achieve the common goal of
fulfilling every nation’s energy demands. All four of these international
players have growing energy needs that, when not met, will rapidly bring
parties to the table. The goal of these negotiations should be treaties that
would ensure peaceful resolutions of conflicts and stability in the region.
Because of the complexity of the Eastern Mediterranean dispute, an
international mediator may be needed rather than a simple negotiation. This
method has been unsuccessful in the past: the Clinton Administration
brought the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus to the table without a resolution, and both the U.S. and France have
led negotiations regarding the Israeli-Lebanese maritime dispute. 122123 The
region’s current energy demands and new ability for development presents
a unique opportunity for international players to resolve these disputes.
Israel discovered fields in its territorial waters that would allow it to
meet, if not exceed, its energy demands while lowering carbon output by
switching from oil production to natural gas production.124 The vast
quantities of natural gas from these two fields would also enable Israel to
export gas to its neighbors. 125 However, the terror organization, Hezbollah,
has threatened to attack Israeli gas platforms in the Mediterranean and, in
terms of exportation, Israel’s most likely access to European trading

121. Id. at 8.
122. Bandow, supra note 118.
123. Karen Ayat, Lebanon Pushes for Resumption of US Efforts to Solve Lebanon-Israel
Maritime Border Dispute, NAT. GAS WORLD (July 9, 2015, 12:10 AM),
http://www.naturalgasworld.com/lebanon-pushes-resumption-us-efforts-lebanon-israelmaritime-border-dispute-24550; see also Maayan Groisman, Lebanon Pushes for French
Mediation in its Maritime Border Dispute with Israel, JERUSALEM POST (Apr. 17, 2016 3:33
PM), http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Lebanon-pushes-for-French-mediation-inits-maritime-border-dispute-with-Israel-451478.
124. Israel, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADM. (July 2016), https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/
analysis.cfm?iso=ISR.
125. Ratner, supra note 109, at 11.
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partners through pipeline transportation would bring about direct contact
with the Cyprian conflict.126
Cyprus heavily relies on imported hydrocarbons, so the ability to
develop its own would be indispensable to energy diversification efforts. 127
Even if the island chose not to use its produced hydrocarbons, the ability to
export such a huge amount of gas could boost the Cyprian economy. 128
However, Turkey wants the island to be unified before drilling these
offshore gas plays in Cyprian waters or before Israel exports natural gas
through the Cyprian zone. 129 This dichotomy would encourage Israel to aid
in the resolution of the Cyprus problem to access preferred European
markets for its natural gas. Lebanon, although not directly dependent on the
other nations, severely fell behind the rest of the world in the research
regarding natural gas development. 130 Even if Lebanon discovered natural
gas in its territorial waters, its would need to contract with a production
company to gain access, as Lebanon lacks such an ability. 131 In total, the
Eastern Mediterranean gas dispute contains five nations, an opposition
government, a maritime boarder dispute, domestic supply problems, threats
of terrorism, an impotent production ability, and this is all overshadowed by
at least half a century of distrust and animosity.
The delicate and intricate proceedings required to produce a lasting
agreement between these nations regarding their access to these natural gas
fields and the ability to economically development them requires skillful
negotiation. Different governments have attempted to mediate areas of this
dispute but have ultimately failed up to this point. Whenever one thinks of
government negotiations, especially to readers in the United States or those
well versed in the U.S. governmental system, one usually expects for
government negotiations to be decided on political partisan lines. This can
also happen in international negotiations: just as certain groups may
influence decision making in domestic politics, the “control over political
resources—the means by which one person can influence the behavior of
other persons—is not distributed equally.” 132 Likewise, certain nations
126. Zhukov, supra note 110.
127. Ratner, supra note 109, at 4.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. James Stocker, No EEZ Solution: The Politics of Oil and Gas in the Eastern
Mediterranean, 66 MIDDLE EAST J. 579, 594 (2012).
131. Id.
132. SHIRLEY V. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN WORLD POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION 2
(Lynne Rienner, 2nd ed. 2010) (citation omitted).
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carry an unequal distribution of the power in international politics, which
can negatively impact the perception of those state players as mediators,
regardless of their legitimate neutrality. Therefore, a change in the type of
international party chosen to mediate these negotiations might very well
lead to a more successful resolution to this dispute.
Corporate Led Negotiations
Although corporations have a bad reputation in the public eye for their
greed and money hoarding, this profit interest might help the negotiations
move forward, especially regarding hydrocarbon development. Despite the
massive value listed on many oil and gas company’s books, these
companies operate in a state of constant commodity price changes and high
operational costs to reap the rewards of hydrocarbon sale.133 Because of this
relatively low profit margin for oil and gas companies, the potential to
economically develop a field stands as the utmost concern, rather than
international political games or the long term strategic goals of state actors
in a region. This places privately held corporations in a prime position to
find common ground between the state actors. The nationalized oil and gas
companies function almost as an extension of the state actors, all within the
framework of international law, without the worry of alternative goals in
their role as mediators.
Traditionally, a deal mediator facilitates the communication between the
different parties. 134 The goal of the mediator, as expressed in international
law, “reconcile[es] the opposing claims and appeas[es] the feeling of
resentment which may have arisen between the States at variance.” 135
Successful resolution of the disputes requires that the parties “disclose their
strategic aims or other concerns in face-to-face encounters at the time of
negotiating their initial agreement.”136 A state actor might have ulterior
motives that may or may not come to the surface during initial agreements,
and the history of prior state actors may weigh heavily on the minds of the
parties to the negotiation. Ideally the mediator of the negotiations remains
neutral but not indifferent to the outcome of the negotiations.137 Oil and gas
companies can hold this position in a way state actors cannot: the
133. Robert L. Bradley, Jr., Oil Company Earnings: Reality Over Rhetoric, FORBES (May
10, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/2011/05/10/oil-company-earnings.html.
134. L. Michael Hager & Robert Pritchard, Lawyers as Deal Mediators: The Value of
Neutrality in International Business Negotiations, 28 INT’L BUS. LAW 404 (2000).
135. WALDOCK, supra note 27, at 83.
136. Hager & Pritchard, supra note 134, at 405.
137. Id. at 406.
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companies are interested in developing the natural gas fields for the mutual
benefit of all parties, whereas the state actors look beyond this limited
scope to wider geopolitical issues. For a region that broke from colonial
powers less than a century ago, state influence over their dealings, no
matter how innocent, might lead to a break down due to mistrust of
motives.
Although these negotiations are international negotiations between state
actors, it boils down to a business negotiation between potential business
partners or at minimum non-adversarial business participants. “Dealing
with cultural differences remains the single most challenging task for the
international business negotiator.” 138 Direct cultural understanding requires
an in-depth analysis of the multi-layered nature of culture and how those
layers interact with, differ from, or mirror one another.139 The religious,
political, economic, and philosophical makeups of these different nations
differ greatly from one another, but they all share a common interest in the
development of their natural gas fields. Corporate players stand in the best
position to work through these differences, as they do not have their own
political agenda but still stand to benefit from remedying the differences at
the outset to avoid the potential meltdown of post-negotiation deals. 140 The
classic understanding of negotiation outcomes as being “win-win” or “winlose” oversimplify the actual outcomes of negotiations, especially in
culturally diverse regions. 141 Parties must understand that they will likely
not accomplish everything that might be on their particular goal sheet.
Oil and gas companies already take part in many negotiations around the
globe. Specific to the Eastern Mediterranean, Lebanon already offered the
chance for both Shell and Exxon to begin exploration of the natural gas in
their territorial waters.142 Although this could stop at just the development
of these assets, the relative lack of a natural gas market in Lebanon might
require either Shell or Exxon to market to gas elsewhere in the world. 143
This could facilitate the states of the Eastern Mediterranean to come to the

138. Garrick Apollon, Cross-Cultural Deal Mediation as a New ADR Method for
International Business Transactions, 20 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 255, 256 (2014) (citation
omitted).
139. Id. at 259.
140. Id. at 260. Mr. Apollon analogizes pre-negotiating cultural understanding to
“premarital counseling” and the deal itself is a “marriage” between the two state players. Id.
141. Id. at 269.
142. Ratner, supra note 109, at 6 (citation omitted).
143. Id. at 8.
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table to resolve differences in this area more productively than state
mediators have been able to in the past.
MNC-led negotiations do have drawbacks for a few reasons. First, in
disputes regarding fields contested by a nation with a nationalized oil and
gas industry—such as the Kuril Islands dispute—a privately held oil and
gas company such as an Exxon would have a lowered negotiating ability
compared to the state-run energy company. Second, the issue of corporate
“neutrality” might be at issue. Oil and gas companies have significant skin
in the game regarding the environmental concerns of carbon output and the
impact on global temperature data.144 The impact of human caused climate
impact goes beyond the scope of this paper, but does importantly factor into
the global perception or the willingness to accept corporate players as
international mediators. Whatever the motivations for oil and gas
companies environmental impacts, their primary interest in the Eastern
Mediterranean would be to develop the fields in an environmentally safe
manner while simultaneously easing international animosity between the
states to ensure the economic viability of the development and prevent the
waste of hydrocarbons.
Allowing oil and gas companies to facilitate negotiations would also help
move development in another fashion. The reliability and strength of
international commerce relies on well negotiated business contracts,
especially in the oil and gas industry. 145 International contract law concerns
those contracts that have chosen “‘between the laws of different States’, or
‘affecting the interests of international trade.’” 146 Contracts resolving the
disputed oil and gas fields would significantly impact international trade
and therefore significantly impact the attitudes of the negotiating parties.
Contracts allow the negotiating parties to dictate where disputes will be
resolved and what law will resolve the dispute. 147 The decision regarding
choice of law gives parties another level of flexibility and another
bargaining chip to reach a potential deal. 148 When brokering deals between
multiple states and private companies, the forum and choice of law to
govern disputes may be just as highly contested as the control of the subject

144. .SCOTT, supra note 132, at 64-65.
145. Cyril Emery, International Commercial Contracts, Hauser Global Law School
Program, N.Y.U. Law, sec. 1, (Mar. 2016), http://www.nyulawglobal.org/Globalex/
International_commercial_contracts.html.
146. Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts, Preamble, Comment 1.
147. Emery, supra note 145, at 2.2.
148. Id.
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of the contract. The Law of the Sea has a unique feature that specifically
may help give flexibility in establish the choice of law.
Rather than immediately becoming subject to international resolution,
parties may try to establish a means of contractual dispute resolution.
However, if the state actors or the MNC remain unable to decide the forum
or the law to apply, the Law of the Sea provides another option. Both state
and non-state actors can petition for dispute resolution before the
International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea.149 Thus a dispute that arose
from the contracts for the development of the gas fields could be
determined by this international tribunal even if the appealing party was not
a state actor, i.e., an MNC. Most other international courts limit the ability
to initiate cases to only state actors. 150 The Law of the Sea does not limit,
however, the ability of state actors to appeal disputes to other international
tribunals. 151 This increased ability of parties to dictate for themselves the
method and forum of future dispute resolution might go a long way in
resolving disputes before they come to a head.
Despite the flexibility that international commercial contracts grant in
choice of law and method of dispute resolution, international law in general
can fall apart in one important way: enforcement. If parties fail or refuse to
abide by the decisions of corporate-led mediation or even international
tribunals, how should other parties respond? The dispute in the South China
Sea presents an ideal reference point for discussion of enforcement
difficulties.
Enforcement of International Law
World War II brought death and destruction on an unimaginable scale.
The U.N. sought to remove the ability or incentive of nations to use armed
conflict to settle differences. 152 The Charter of the U.N. specifically limited
the use of force to self-defense or when explicitly authorized by the
Security Council. 153 The Security Council may authorize members of the
U.N. to use a variety of non-military enforcement mechanisms to enforce
international law and the decisions of different tribunals made in

149. Noyes, supra note 62, at 130 (citation omitted).
150. Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in
International Judicial Proceedings, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 611, 613 (1994).
151. Noyes, supra note 62, at 113.
152. SCOTT, supra note 132, at 99.
153. Id.
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accordance with international law.154 If these economic, diplomatic, or
political enforcement provisions fail or would be inadequate, the Security
Council may authorize the use of military force to “maintain or restore
international peace.” 155 The Security Council has authorized such force few
times since the establishment of the U.N. but usually only after an act of
international violence or war has already taken place.156 It is therefore
unlikely that the Security Council would authorize military force against a
nation that simply fails to abide by a decision of an international tribunal.
In relation to the Law of the Sea and the enforcement of international
maritime law, the enforcement mechanisms suffer from decentralization. 157
Specifically, Article 94 empowers each state to control and have
jurisdiction over the ships flying their flag. 158 The divested enforcement
mechanism creates a twofold problem for every nation whether they are a
party to the Law of the Sea. First, states will be less likely to expend
resources to enforce provisions that either negatively impact their interests
or have negligible impacts thereon, and, second, the developing world lacks
the resources to enforce international law provisions effectively. 159 Both
issues apply to disputes regarding rights to subsea petroleum as nations will
be unlikely to amicably yield their perceived rights or the disputing nations
may be unable to effectively act upon their rights due to economic or
military poverty. Perhaps the most notable example of such difficulty in
enforcement occurred in the international arbitration award in the South
China Sea.
The territorial disputes of the South China Sea is some of the most
highly contested in the world today. Territorial claims to the area date back
for hundreds if not thousands of years between many nations. 160 Although
these claims encompass far more than natural resources, control of fishing
and petroleum rights constitute major bargaining points for different
powers. As all the parties have formally ratified the Convention on the Law
of the Sea, an international arbitration took place to resolve the hotly
154. U.N. Charter, supra note 43, at art. 41.
155. Id. at art. 42.
156. SCOTT, supra note 132, at 103.
157. Doris König, The Enforcement of the International Law of the Sea by Coastal and
Port States, 62 ZETTSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENSTLICHES RECHT UND
VOLKERRECHT 1, 3 (2002).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 7.
160. In re South China Sea Arbitration, PCA Case no. 2013-19, Award, at ¶¶ 172-187
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016), http://www.pcacases.com/pcadocs/PH-CN%20-%2020160712%20%20Award.pdf.
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contested rights. 161 The arbitration rejected the Republic of China's claims
to much of the South China Sea, siding with the arguments of the
Philippines. 162 Almost immediately, Beijing announced their intentions to
refuse to abide by the terms of the arbitration, claiming the award to be
“invalid, null and void.” 163 If China follows through with these threats to
refuse to abide by the arbitrational ruling, what party sits in the best
position to enforce the arbitrators decision?
The Law of the Sea calls upon the flag carriers of the nation to enforce
international law or the decision of the international tribunals.164 The
Philippines lacks the necessary economic and political clout to adequately
enforce the arbitrational award; China outranks the Philippines in terms of
GDP by more than twenty to one. 165 Lacking the individual capacity, the
Philippines would likely turn to the mercy of the U.N. and the international
community to aid in the enforcement of the arbitrational award. The volatile
nature of the relationship between China and the rest of the world would
likely lead to apprehension on the part of other state actors to put pressure
on China to abide by an unfavorable decision. In addition, China’s position
on the U.N. Security Council would prevent a definitive Security Council
decision regarding any sanctions or force.
Enforcement of international law has troubled state actors and IGOs
regardless of how powerful the different countries in the situation might be.
The best-case scenario would be for the international community to avoid
the potential conflict all together. Global politics often drive parties to avoid
making deals out of their own national pride or aspirations to assert regional
dominance. Acquiescing to the demands of another nation, particularly a
nation that has adverse claims, would cause a blow to national pride. Rather
than definitively and publically settling a dispute regarding a maritime
border or control of islands and resources in a region, countries could enter
brokered agreements with commercial entities, as opposed to state actors, to

161. See id.
162. Id.
163. Anders Corr, Enforce Law of the Sea Ruling: Stand with the Philippines Now, or
Later Face China Alone, FORBES (Jul. 13, 2016, 6:19 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
anderscorr/2016/07/13/enforce-law-of-the-sea-ruling-stand-with-the-philippines-now-orlater-face-china-alone/#705464d14ac1.
164. See König, supra note 157, at 3.
165. World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, (2015), https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rp.html,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publica
tions/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html (comparing the 2015 GDP numbers for the Republic
of the Philippines and The People’s Republic of China).
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use petroleum or the profits derived from the sale of petroleum to quietly
settle disputes.
The Kuril Islands, the South China Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean
maritime disputes all share one commonality: historically rooted claims to
the disputed area paired with distrust of the other party. The complication
of international law does not allow for a one-size-fits-all model, but the use
of a private, commercial entity, such as an oil and gas company, in the
negotiation process may allow for a dispute to be resolved peacefully
without the countries feeling as if they have lost. For this to work
effectively and for parties to trust the oil and gas companies as mediators in
their negotiations, these must begin prior to any submission to the disputes
to an international tribunal. Once before a tribunal for definitive resolution
per international law, then the commercial entity would have a vested
interest in the nation with the more favorable trade policies receiving the
arbitration award or court judgment. Oil and gas companies can be used to
broker the agreements in such a way that neither country officially
renounces claim to the disputed maritime border.
All the countries mentioned in the above disputes have the desire to
control a means to provide energy for their country and potentially export
the oil and gas to help add money to the state coffers. Herein lies the
potential solution to the dispute: energy and money. The oil and gas
companies would have to find the right politicians from those two countries
that would be willing to hear out the potential deal, but the produced
petroleum and the money derived therefrom could be used as an alternative
to a formal border-dispute claim. The oil and gas companies would act both
as mediator and intermediary with the oil and gas and distribute it to the
countries per the brokered deal. This solution sets aside all the other
implications that accompany the maritime border disputes outside of
control of natural resources but would grant parties the oil and gas or the
revenue in exchange for quieting the dispute. These states need not formally
renounce their claims regarding the maritime border, but rather quietly
accept the revenue resulting from the deal. This proposed solution is not
perfect and would suffer some difficulties, including lack of leverage and
skepticism of corporations as international actors. Despite these shortfalls,
the proposed solution is better than the current mechanisms and offers a
greater potential of success.
If corporate actors broker such deals, exchanging the rights to develop
the petroleum plays in exchange for the quieting of the maritime border
dispute, the corporate actors would lack leverage in the deal. Corporate
entities want to ensure, as best as possible, that their corporate assets remain
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secure and in their exclusive control, even during financial downturn and
political unrest. To make sure that state actors do not simply renege on the
agreement, the payouts in terms of resources or revenue percentage would
have to be directed more toward the countries, creating a lower profit
margin for the oil and gas companies. The companies could also work into
the deal the requirement to seek resolution of any subsequent dispute in an
international arbitration, but this leads to the next concern with the role that
corporations play in the international arena. It is not so much the worry that
private entities play a role that government entities can also play, but when
private companies exercise “direct and very significant influence” over the
development of international law.166 The concerns for many international
legal scholars come from the prioritization of certain international contracts
over that of later national law within the countries.167 However, the types of
agreements suggested by this comment would not come from private
entities asserting their control over national law or to directly influence or
alter international law. Rather, in exchange for the right to drill and
develop, these commercial entities could use financial gain to quiet
international disputes and placate the potential violence or regional unrest
caused by ongoing maritime disputes.
Conclusion
The Convention on the Law of the Sea brought countries together to join
their mutual interests for a uniform international maritime law. Although
the Law of the Sea helped to alleviate certain concerns regarding maritime
law, certain disputes, due to their deep rooted historical and political
differences, continue to proliferate despite the best efforts of the
international community. Many of these areas contain massive amounts of
untapped petroleum resources, so a resolution to these disputes would not
only solve international diplomatic problems but also help certain countries
economically. So far, mediations led by state actors or international
governing bodies have not led to successful settlements of certain maritime
disputes. Rather than doubling down on the efforts for state actors to
resolve these disputes or force the parties into international court or
arbitration, perhaps a new route could be attempted.
Despite the global skeptical perception of corporate involvement in
international legal affairs, private involvement could help the process.
166. Vaughan Lowe, Corporations as International Law Actors and Law-Makers, 14
ITAL. YBK. INT'L L., 23, 23-26 (2004).
167. Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 229, 231 (2015).
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Specifically, within the realm of oil and gas development, oil and gas
companies could play the role of the meditator between state actors. Oil and
gas companies share a common, limited goal with the state actors involved
in these disputes: develop oil and gas in an economically and
environmentally responsible manner. The commercial entities lack
geopolitical opinions regarding state action—so long as that state action
does not negatively impact their petroleum development—which places
them in a good mediation position. The fungibility of money presents the
potential for an alternative solution: rather than a signed treaty defining the
borders, the two or more countries would silence their border disagreements
in exchange for economically advantageous petroleum development.
Nationalized oil and gas companies may present a problem for privately
owned companies to mediate effectively, but nationalized and private oil
and gas companies have worked together in development efforts.
Successful commercial mediation would allow for the countries to develop
their natural resources through a third party and settle a long-standing
conflict without resorting to an international decision maker. Unsuccessful
commercial mediation would leave the state actors in the same place
regarding their disagreement as to their maritime boundaries and the oil and
gas companies would have unsuccessfully used time and money to
negotiate for the rights to drill—an all too common cost of doing business
in the oil and gas community.
This comment’s proposal does not claim to have uncovered the secret
key to international dispute resolution. Rather than allowing the disputed
control over huge deposits of subsea petroleum to sink negotiation efforts,
this author’s suggestion is for internal parties to use those deposits to
facilitate a solution to the disputes. Oil and gas companies can use the
potential payout from the petroleum development to calm, or even facilitate
a resolution to, the maritime disputes. This successful facilitation of
resolution would dispel the need for the countries having to submit to an
international decision making body in which one state wins and the other
state loses. While not the perfect solution, the encouragement of oil and gas
companies to serve as mediators in maritime disputes for the control of
petroleum deposits could present a positive alternative to the current state
of international dispute resolution.
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